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Subjective feelings are a central feature of human life. We defined
the organization and determinants of a feeling space involving 100
core feelings that ranged from cognitive and affective processes to
somatic sensations and common illnesses. The feeling space was
determined by a combination of basic dimension rating, similarity
mapping, bodily sensation mapping, and neuroimaging meta-
analysis. A total of 1,026 participants took part in online surveys
where we assessed (i) for each feeling, the intensity of four hypoth-
esized basic dimensions (mental experience, bodily sensation, emo-
tion, and controllability), (ii) subjectively experienced similarity of the
100 feelings, and (iii) topography of bodily sensations associated
with each feeling. Neural similarity between a subset of the feeling
states was derived from the NeuroSynth meta-analysis database
based on the data from 9,821 brain-imaging studies. All feelings
were emotionally valenced and the saliency of bodily sensations
correlated with the saliency of mental experiences associated with
each feeling. Nonlinear dimensionality reduction revealed five feel-
ing clusters: positive emotions, negative emotions, cognitive pro-
cesses, somatic states and illnesses, and homeostatic states.
Organization of the feeling space was best explained by basic dimen-
sions of emotional valence, mental experiences, and bodily sensa-
tions. Subjectively felt similarity of feelingswas associated with basic
feeling dimensions and the topography of the corresponding bodily
sensations. These findings reveal a map of subjective feelings that
are categorical, emotional, and embodied.
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We humans constantly experience an ever-changing streamof subjective feelings that is only abolished during sleep,
brain damage, and drug-induced altered states of the central ner-
vous system. It is however most puzzling how our mental world is
organized. External and internal pieces of information that pro-
ceed beyond nonconscious processing may be transformed into
reliably reportable subjective experiences (1) or feelings that bear
distinctive subjective qualia—the unique way how we feel different
things. For example, trying to recall the title of the last book we
read feels qualitatively different from the piercing headache during
a high fever. The term feeling has multiple psychological and
physiological definitions ranging from the subjectively accessible
component of emotions to somatosensory experiences, ideas, and
beliefs. Here, we use the word feeling to simply refer to the current,
subjectively accessible phenomenological state of an individual.
These inner sensations organize our mental lives and are also vital
signs of our well-being (2, 3). Consequently, various unpleasant
feelings are the most common reasons for seeking medical care (4).
Despite the centrality of subjective feelings to ourselves and our
conscious well-being, the relative organization and determinants of
different feelings have remained poorly understood.
We experience in our bodies changes that relate to our well-
being, physical activity, stress level, and emotional state. Thus, in-
teroceptive and somatosensory inputs contribute significantly to
the subjective feelings (5–7). Because the survival of an organism
depends on its ability to maintain its physiology within an optimal
homeostatic range, the ability to consciously monitor and feel
certain physiological states (such as thirst and hunger) and detect
potential tissue damage has been critical already to our ancestors (3,
7). Such feelings vary markedly in their mental saliency. For ex-
ample, heartbeat and digestive processes go most of the time un-
noticed, whereas it is almost impossible to abolish the agony upon
hearing of a loss of a dear friend. Such graded intensity of feelings
allows filtering out unimportant ones from the limited-capacity
working space in the executive system and focusing our executive
problem-solving skills to deal with the most urgent ones (8).
Positive and negative emotions—physiological, motor, and cog-
nitive programs—are inherently associated with subjective feelings
(7, 9), and emotion is often considered as an essential building
block of consciousness. Emergence of conscious feelings could thus
require that the brain generates sensorimotor neural activation
patterns of objects or events, as well as neural patterns regarding
how (positively or negatively) these events change the state of the
organism (10). Despite multiple classification schemes for specific
emotions (11, 12), the contribution of emotion to other feeling
states not traditionally considered as emotions (such as cognition
and homeostatic processes), remains unknown. Finally, our ability
to control different bodily and mental states varies greatly. A
simple shift of attention across the room can be accomplished
swiftly, while getting up from the bed at 4 AM to catch an early
flight requires substantial effort, and chocking down the intense
Significance
Subjective feelings are a central feature of human life, yet their
relative organization has remained elusive. We mapped the
“human feeling space” for 100 core feelings ranging from
cognitive and affective processes to somatic sensations; in the
analysis, we combined basic dimension rating, similarity map-
ping, bodily sensation mapping, and neuroimaging meta-
analysis. All feelings were emotionally loaded, and saliencies
of bodily and mental experiences were correlated. Feelings
formed five groups: positive emotions, negative emotions, cog-
nitive processes, somatic states, and homeostatic states. Feeling
space was best explained by emotionality, mental experience,
and bodily sensation topographies. Subjectively felt similarity of
feelings was associated with basic feeling dimensions and the
bodily sensation maps. This shows that subjective feelings are
categorical, emotional, and embodied.
Author contributions: L.N., R.H., J.K.H., and E.G. designed research; L.N. and E.G. per-
formed research; L.N. and E.G. analyzed data; and L.N., R.H., J.K.H., and E.G. wrote
the paper.
Reviewers: C.K., Netherlands Institute for Neuroscience; and L.S., Max Planck Institute of
Psychiatry.
The authors declare no conflict of interest.
This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).
Data deposition: All datasets and resources are available at https://doi.org/10.5281/
zenodo.1291729.
1To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: lauri.nummenmaa@utu.fi or riitta.
hari@aalto.fi.
This article contains supporting information online at www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.
1073/pnas.1807390115/-/DCSupplemental.
Published online August 28, 2018.
9198–9203 | PNAS | September 11, 2018 | vol. 115 | no. 37 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.1807390115
grieving in one’s partner’s funeral would be next to impossible. The
sense of controllability or agency—our experience of initiating,
executing, and controlling thoughts and actions—is a central tenet
of human phenomenological experience (13, 14). Because such
sense of control binds our thoughts and actions to our ownership
(13), it could also be one key dimension of subjective feelings.
Here, we address the fundamental principles that organize the
human feeling states (SI Appendix, Fig. S1). We asked (i) how
humans organize their feeling states, (ii) what kind of mental
experiences and bodily sensations would best explain the repre-
sentational structure of the feelings, and (iii) whether the mental
experiences and bodily sensations are associated with distinct
neural activation patterns. We focused on mapping the basic di-
mensions (Experiment 1), ontology (Experiment 2), as well as
bodily (Experiment 3) and neural (meta-analysis and synthesis of
Experiments 1–3) basis of a broad array of feeling states (SI Ap-
pendix, Fig. S2 and Table S1). We first quantified the relative
intensities of four hypothesized core subjective dimensions (in-
tensity of bodily sensations, saliency of mental experience, emo-
tional valence, and agency) of 100 common subjective feelings
spanning from homeostatic (e.g., hunger) and emotional (e.g.,
pleasure) states to cognitive functions (e.g., recalling). We also
measured the relative frequency of experiencing each feeling as
the lapse since the last remembered occurrence of each feeling.
Next, we measured the experienced similarity of these subjective
feelings and mapped the topography of bodily sensations associ-
ated with each feeling. Neural activation patterns associated with
each state were derived using large-scale meta-analysis of fMRI
data. We quantified the spatial representations of these states and
linked the representational organization of the subjective states
with their bodily and neural activation patterns. We show that
subjective mental states are embodied and emotionally valenced,
and that there is a clear correspondence between the mental ex-
periences and their bodily basis that also pertains to the underlying
neural activation patterns in the bodily domain.
Results
Experiment 1: Basic Dimensions of Subjective Feelings. Fig. 1 shows
the associations between the core dimensions of subjective feel-
ings, and SI Appendix, Fig. S2 shows the corresponding probability
density functions of the data aggregated across subjects (see SI
Appendix, Table S1 for means and SEs of mean). All tested states
were associated with salient mental and bodily sensations. The
relative strength of the mental experiences and bodily sensations
differed greatly across states but were linearly associated, when
fitted with separate regression lines for two major clusters in the
data. The majority of the feeling states were experienced as
emotional—either pleasant or unpleasant. Only few, mainly
physiological and cognitive, states were experienced as affec-
tively neutral. As expected, emotional intensity (i.e., deviation
from the midpoint neutral affective state toward pleasure or
displeasure) was significantly associated with the intensity of
both mental and bodily sensations. Pleasant and controllable
states were more frequent than unpleasant and uncontrollable
ones. Finally, subjects felt less control over unpleasant than
pleasant feelings and less control over bodily than mental states.
Experiment 2: Mapping the Mental Feeling Space. We next mapped
the topographical organization of the feeling states based on the
similarity ratings obtained in Experiment 2. Fig. 2 shows the 2D
representation of the feeling space. The density-based clustering
(DBSCAN; ref. 15) and t-distributed stochastic neighbor embed-
ding (t-SNE; ref. 16) solutions revealed five discrete clusters:
positive emotions, negative emotions, cognitive processes, somatic
states and illnesses, and homeostatic states. The topographical di-
mension intensity heatmaps (based on Experiment 1) were then
used to evaluate how the states in each cluster differ with respect to
the underlying basic dimensions. The two dimensions of the t-SNE
derived feeling space mapped primarily to the strength of
mental feelings on vertical axis and emotional valence (pleasant–
unpleasant) on the horizontal axis, so that both positive and
negative emotional states were experienced strongly, and ho-
meostatic processes and illnesses weakly in the mind. Emotional
valence was also associated with the sense of control, in that
sensations associated with cognition and positive emotions were
the easiest, and those associated with illnesses and negative
emotions the hardest to control. Intensity of bodily sensations
mapped to the bottom corners of the space. The feeling spaces
were concordant across participants with a mean Spearman’s
correlation split-half reliability of 0.94 (SI Appendix, Fig. S3).
Fig. 3 shows the bodily sensations associated with each feeling
state, revealing that almost all feeling states were associated with a
unique, discernible bodily sensation map. Although the organi-
zation of these bodily maps was associated with the organization of
the subjective organization of the feeling states (i.e., Experiment
2), t-SNE mapping based on the bodily sensations revealed more
clearly a linear continuum along the distributed versus focal fin-
gerprints of bodily feelings (SI Appendix, Figs. S4 and S5).
Representational Similarity Across Neural Activation and Domains of
Subjective Feelings. Finally, we assessed the representational simi-
larity between the measured features of subjective experience. This
across-dimension representational similarity analysis (RSA; ref. 17)
(Fig. 4) revealed that the ground-truth similarity metric (i.e., sub-
jectively felt organization) was significantly associated with all of
the basic dimensions, as well as with bodily sensations and semantic
similarity. Bodily sensation maps were also significantly associated
with all other dimensions except controllability and lapse. Semantic
similarity was associated with bodily saliency, emotion, bodily
sensation maps, and neural similarity (NeuroSynth). Neural simi-
larity structure was, in turn, associated with similarity of bodily
Fig. 1. Associations between the basic dimensions of subjective experience.
Histograms show the distribution for each evaluated dimension with over-
laid probability density curves per clustering in Experiment 2. Scatterplots
show median z-scores for each of the 100 feelings (see SI Appendix, Fig. S2
for the complete distribution densities). Color coding of the tokens is based
on clustering per Experiment 2. Normalized data are modeled with one or
two LS regression lines depending on the optimal fit. All reported values are
Spearman’s correlations *P < 0.05, **P < 0.005.
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saliency, bodily sensation maps, and semantic similarity [all P
values < 0.05, false discovery rate (FDR) corrected].
Discussion
Our data provide a detailed map of the human feeling space, where
subjective feelings were strongly coupled with bodily sensations,
and nearly all subjective experiences were qualified by emotional
tone. Subjective states were best described on a 2D map with five
distinct feeling clusters. Representational similarity analysis revealed
strong correspondence between the mental feeling space and the
corresponding bodily sensations, basic dimensions of subjective ex-
perience, as well as similarity between neural and bodily sensation
maps across different subjective feelings. Altogether these findings
show that feeling states are categorical, emotional, and embodied.
Organization of the Feeling Space. Subjective feelings were organized
as a 2D space with discrete five-cluster structure (positive emotions,
negative emotions, cognitive processes, somatic states and illnesses,
and homeostatic and sensory states). This mapping was concordant
across individuals, suggesting that the feeling space is minimally
influenced by individual differences. Thus, its organization likely
reflects inherent coupling between the sensory and interoceptive
systems and the frontoparietal brain circuit supporting consciously
accessible feelings (18). When linked with the topography intensity
of basic feeling-dimension ratings, the feeling space was best de-
scribed by the orthogonal dimensions of affective valence (pleasant–
unpleasant) and mental saliency (low–high), with bodily sensations
being most profoundly experienced on the antidiagonal (positive
emotions and illnesses; Fig. 2). The clustering of the feelings likely
reflects the way the brain binds and weighs the interoceptive and
exteroceptive inputs for generating each feeling state.
When individuals evaluate the presence of mental functions in
other agents, the presence of physiological, emotional, and cognitive–
perceptual experiences, and the sense of agency, are the most im-
portant determinants guiding the decision (19, 20). These dimensions
were salient also in the present data, indicating that our own feelings
provide the anchors against which to attribute mental states of other
beings. Shared mapping of feelings across individuals may thus serve
important social functions. For example, the ability to exchange
conscious states across individuals via action–perception loops is an
essential building block of sociability (21), and the capability to
promote social cohesion by sharing feelings has likely yielded sig-
nificant evolutionary advantages already to our ancestors (22).
Feelings Are Coupled with Bodily Processes. Feelings were system-
atically referenced to bodily states, even for states considered as
purely cognitive, such as attending or reasoning. Additionally, the
more strongly some feeling was experienced in the body, the more
salient it was mentally. Different feelings were associated with
distinct bodily fingerprints, and representational structure of these
bodily maps converged with the mentally experienced structure of
feelings: The qualia of the mental experience of any given feeling
were associated with the unique topography of the concurrent
bodily sensations. This finding accords with results showing that
voluntary reproduction of bodily states associated with, for ex-
ample, specific emotions leads to the subjective feeling of the
corresponding emotion (23). Accordingly, an individual’s current
emotional feeling can be accurately classified using signals from
the primary somatosensory and insular cortices (24). Thus, inter-
oceptive signaling—associated primarily with homeostasis and a
threatening tissue damage—is an important feature of subjective
feelings in general (3, 7), similarly as has been previously established
specifically for emotional states (25, 26). Such embodiment of
subjective experiences may also extend to self-awareness: Adults
and children consistently think of “self” as occupying a physical
location within the body—oftentimes in head, but also remarkably
often in the torso (27). However, even when some types of spinal-
cord lesions prevent interoceptive signals from entering the brain,
they do not necessarily abolish subjective awareness; for example,
patients with pure autonomic failure can still experience embodied
Fig. 2. The feeling space. (Upper) Two-dimensional map of the feeling space based on the sorting task average distance matrix between items arranged by t-
SNE and clustered with DBSCAN. Color coding indicates cluster structure; gray feelings do not belong clearly to any cluster. Colored items with black edge are
DBSCAN border elements. To retain the information of the distance matrix the closest three items for each node are connected with lines. Thick dark lines are
showing distances that belong to the top 33rd percentile of the visualized lines (i.e., the closest items). (Lower) Heatmaps showing how strongly each basic
dimension of subjective experience is associated with each discrete feeling at each location of the feeling space. Color coding shows the relative intensity as
median z-score (as in Fig. 1) from high (red) to low (blue).
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subjective states, such as emotions (28). Moreover, complete bi-
lateral lesions to the interoceptive regions in the insula do not
abolish emotions (29). Bodily feedback cannot thus be the sole
contributor to subjective feelings, as was also confirmed by our
representational similarity analysis.
Emotion as a Core Dimension of Subjective Feeling. Nearly all sub-
jective feelings were imbued with emotional qualities. During
emotions, the benefit versus harm associated with external and
internal events triggers an integrated blend of good or bad feel-
ings, or vigorous activation or relaxation. Such affective sensations
involve cognitive, perceptual, and physiological processes and thus
constitute the core of human subjective experience in general (9).
Emotional intensity emerged as the best predictor for the orga-
nization of the subjective feeling space in the RSA. Despite both
scientists (30) and laypersons alike often considering affect and
cognition at least partially independent, we found that most
feelings actually carry affective valence, further underlining the
importance of affect to conscious states in general (10). Prior
studies have focused on mapping the feelings associated with
prototypical emotions (11, 12). However, the present data show
that canonical basic and social emotions occupy a limited area of
the total feeling space, which covers a wide array of mental and
bodily functions and states. This result fits with the reasoning that
the same frontoparietal brain systems stand as the basis of both
emotional and nonemotional feelings but so that input from
subcortical and other cortical systems associated with the
physiological and behavioral aspects of emotions is needed to add
the affective quality to certain feelings (18).
Links Among Mind, Body, and the Brain in Generating Feelings. The
representational similarity analysis revealed that the subjective
feelings have multiple determinants. Using the arrangement-
based organization as the “ground truth” metric, we found that it
was associated with both the organization of the feeling-specific
bodily topographies as well as with the relative intensities of the
basic dimensions of feelings. The organization of subjective feel-
ings at mental and embodied level, however, corresponded with
the pure semantic (“is a”) similarities only weakly, confirming that
the feeling space does not simply reflect the interchangeability
of the semantic concepts (i.e., names of the feelings) used in the
study (31). Instead, each feeling state is likely characterized by a
combination of interoceptive and exteroceptive inputs evaluated
also with respect to emotional qualities. We propose that humans
intuitively bind these noisy inputs into coherent subjective expe-
riences, similarly as has been previously found to happen for
sensory percepts, so that high pitches, bright colors, and high
spatial positions go together (32).
Neural organization of feelings was also associated with their
bodily basis and database-determined semantic similarity, pro-
viding evidence of specific neural signatures of specific subjectively
felt bodily states (10, 26). However, such direct mapping does not
extend to mental states, and no association was found between
the subjective and neural dimensions. This finding is not fully
Fig. 3. Bodily feeling maps. Pixel intensities show regions where each feeling was associated with statistically significant (P < 0.05, FDR corrected) bodily
sensations. The data are arranged into the matrix approximately as in Fig. 2; clustering is per Experiment 2. Colorbar indicates the effect size. See SI Appendix,
Figs. S4 and S5 for spatial arrangement per t-SNE.
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unexpected, given that gross neural activation patterns associated
with, for example, seeing (occipital cortex) and hearing (temporal
cortex) are spatially divergent, despite felt similarity of the pro-
cesses. Thus, unlike bodily feeling states, higher-order subjective
mental states do not necessarily reduce to local brain activations.
However, our analysis is constrained by the spatial accuracy of
fMRI and the univariate nature of the NeuroSynth database. Prior
studies employing multivariate pattern recognition have indeed
linked the similarity of neural activation patterns with the similarity
of subjective sensory percepts (33) and feelings (24), suggesting a
direct link between brain activity and subjective experiences.
Limitations.We used a relatively crude distinction of the subjective
states—for example, “seeing” would likely feel very different when
we are seeing a growling black bear rather than a cute baby.
However, our goal was at this stage to characterize the relation-
ship of the most fundamental aspects of human feelings, rather
than the fine-grained dissection of the qualia within each possible
domain. Explaining how the distinct qualia, such as the pleasure
derived from having sex or the agony triggered by seeing our loved
ones suffer, are associated with neuronal activity is known as the
“hard problem” of consciousness (34). Although our data clearly
point toward bodily and emotional basis of subjective feelings, this
connection does not obviously explain how bodily sensations are
transformed into subjective qualia. This problem is further high-
lighted by the lack of representational similarity between sub-
jective feelings and their neural signatures (Fig. 4): We do not
understand well how these feelings are generated in the brain.
Finally, humans have a limited access to the workings of their
higher-order cognitive processes (35), and we cannot ascertain
how closely the self-reported subjective sensations associate with
the underlying neural and cognitive machinery.
Conclusions
Why do we experience anything at all? The present data suggest
that we feel bodily events that are potentially good or bad to us.
We found that subjective feelings are categorical, emotionally
valenced, and embodied, and that the valence and mental in-
volvement are the most important dimensions of the subjective
feelings. These results extend the current models of the role of
somatosensation (36) and embodiment (26, 37) in emotional
processing to more general-level mechanisms determining the
nature of human experiences.
Materials and Methods
The original list of the feeling tokens was derived from the American Psy-
chological Association Glossary of Psychological Terms (https://dictionary.apa.
org/), complemented with basic physiological and homeostatic processes, as
well as with common illnesses. We then selected a total of 100 core feelings
(SI Appendix, Table S1) belonging to seven broad a priori categories: cog-
nition (e.g., thinking, reasoning), sensation and perception (e.g., seeing,
hearing), motivational states (e.g., wanting, craving), emotional states (e.g.,
anger, fear), homeostatic states (e.g., hunger, thirst), physiological processes
(e.g., breathing, sleeping), common illnesses (e.g., flu, fever), and feelings
central to common psychiatric disorders (e.g., depression, anxiety). A pilot
study confirmed that these sensations cover both frequently and in-
frequently experienced feeling states.
SI Appendix, Fig. S1 summarizes the experimental protocol. Altogether
1,026 participants (880 females; 146 males) completed the experiments
(Experiment 1: n = 339, MDage = 27 y, 300 females, 39 males; Experiment 2:
n = 226, MDage = 27 y, 181 females, 45 males; Experiment 3: n = 461,
MDage = 26 y, 399 females, 62 males). They were recruited from university
email lists and social media. All experimental studies were conducted online.
The participants first gave informed consent and provided background in-
formation (age, sex, and education). After this, the participants were pro-
vided with the instructions for the experiment. Data acquisition and analysis
code and the datasets are available at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.
1291729. Aalto University Institutional Review Board approved all experi-
ments involving human subjects.
Experiment 1: Basic Dimensions of Subjective Feelings. We hypothesized that
four main dimensions (saliency of mental experience, saliency of bodily sen-
sation, emotion, and controllability) would underlie the feeling space. To map
these dimensions to specific feelings, the participants were shown the name of
one candidate feeling at a time on the computer screen. For each feeling, the
participant was asked to evaluate (i) how much that feeling is felt in the body
(not at all–extremely much), (ii) how much that feeling is experienced in the
mind (not at all–extremely much), (iii) how pleasant it feels (extremely
unpleasant–extremely pleasant), and (iv) how much control they feel having
on it (not at all–extremely much) on visual analog scales (VAS). An additional
VAS was used for measuring (v) the frequency of experiencing the feelings,
based on the last remembered occurrence of each feeling (within the last
hour–last year, or not at all). Due to the large number of tokens (100), each
participant rated 20 randomly chosen feeling tokens; they were asked to rate
more tokens if they were willing to. Participants not completing at least one
full batch (20) of tokens were excluded (n = 88). Associations between the
basic dimensions were estimated using Pearson correlation and by fitting least-
square regression lines between the dimensions. Because Experiment 2
revealed a clear cluster structure of the feelings, we fitted either one or two
regression lines to each pair of variables depending on the optimal fit.
Experiment 2: Mapping the Mental Feeling Space.We next mapped the mental
feeling space using similarity rating using a modified computer-based Q-sort
task. Subjects were shown all tokens as a randomly ordered list on the left
side of the screen, and theywere asked to arrange themtoa rectangular box on
the right so that states feeling similar would be close to each other. This
technique is known to yield consistent results with direct pairwise ratings (r:s >
0.9; ref. 38). It was stressed that the arrangement should be based on the
similarity of feelings, rather than on conceptual or semantic relatedness. Par-
ticipants could adjust the placement as long as they wanted. Participants
moving less than 25% of the tokens (n = 138) were excluded from the data,
and tokens not moved into the target area were not considered in the anal-
yses. Pairwise similarities between the tokens were extracted as their Euclidian
distance. Distances were scaled so that the maximum distance across all par-
ticipants was set to 1. Consistency of participant-wise feeling space arrange-
ment was estimated using split-half reliability (Spearman’s correlation) over
5,000 random splits. Mean distance matrix was constructed (median distance
matrix was essentially similar, r = 0.99 P < 0.001 in Mantel test) and subjected
to DBSCAN (15) to obtain reproducible clusters as well as “border” elements,
and “outlier” elements that do not fit in a single cluster. Next, t-SNE was used
to visualize the underlying structure of the phenomenological space (16).
To test how different basic dimensions of feelings determined in Experiment
1 project to the subjective feeling space determined in Experiment 2, we
modeled, for each data point in the t-SNE–derived feeling space, the intensity
of each basic dimension with a Gaussian kernel with 8-unit FWHM weighted
Fig. 4. Representational similarity between determinants of subjective expe-
rience (Spearman’s correlation). Each cell in the matrix represents pairwise RSA
between two similarity matrices for the 100 feelings; *P < 0.05 (FDR corrected),
**P < 0.005 (FDR corrected, permutation-based significance thresholding).
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with the mean basic dimension rating of that token in Experiment 2. The
resulting maps thus reveal how strongly each basic dimension of subjective
experience is felt across the 2D feeling space. This representation, based on
t-SNE and the basic dimensions, thus merges the traditional network and
space-based representations often employed in semantic analyses of concepts
used in natural language (31), and it provides straightforward access to the
organization of the subjective feelings at multiple levels of analysis.
Experiment 3: Mapping the Bodily Sensation Space. Bodily topography of
feelings was mapped using the emBODY tool (ref. 26; https://version.aalto.fi/
gitlab/eglerean/embody, ref. 39). Subjects were shown one candidate feel-
ing at a time, and were asked to color, in a blank body shape, whereabouts
in the body the state feels. Due to a large number of tokens, each partici-
pant completed the ratings for 20 randomly chosen tokens after which they
were given an option to complete another batch of 20 until they quit or had
completed all of the 100 tokens. Subjects not completing at least one whole
batch of 10 tokens were excluded. The resulting subject-wise bodily sensa-
tion maps were averaged for each state and subjected to random effects
analysis. Bodily sensation maps (BSMs) for each state were obtained by mass
univariate t tests against zero feeling values (with FDR correction across all
pixels and all tokens). Similarity matrices for the different feelings were
constructed by computing Euclidean distance between the unthresholded
mean BSM effect size maps between each pair of feelings.
Meta-Analysis of Neural Activation Patterns Across Feeling States. To estimate
the feeling state-wise neural activation patterns, we employed data from
Neurosynth database (www.neurosynth.org). This tool allows automated
meta-analysis of brain activations from tens of thousands of fMRI studies (ref.
40; analysis date November 15, 2016). We first obtained the full list of subject
terms of studies stored in Neurosynth. Two independent raters evaluated the
best possible (if any) matches from the Neurosynth term list with the subjective
states used in the behavioral experiments. Thresholded Neurosynth reverse
inference maps (summarizing altogether 9,821 brain imaging experiments)
were downloaded for the terms found in the database. If two Neurosynth
terms matched with one token (e.g., “attention” and “attending”), their maps
were averaged. Altogether we found NeuroSynth database matches for 44 of
the 100 tokens. Similarity between the meta-analytic activation maps was
determined as the Spearman’s correlation between their voxels.
Representational Similarity Across Neural Activation and Domains of Subjective
Feelings. We next asked how strongly the different dimensions of subjective
feelings (Experiment 1—Basic dimensions; Experiment 2—Mental feeling
space; Experiment 3—Bodily sensation space; Meta-analysis—Neural activation
patterns) are associated with each other as well as with the brain activation
patterns underlying each state. We also tested whether the similarity structure
of feelings or their bodily and neural underpinnings would reflect only their
semantic relatedness, rather than subjectively felt similarity of the feeling
themselves. We thus computed the semantic distance between each word pair
using the SimService tool (ref. 41; swoogle.umbc.edu/SimService/). Semantic
distance was computed using both Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) based on
two corpuses (Refined Stanford WebBase corpus, and LDC English Gigawords
Corpus) and WordNet relationships between words. The tool provides four
measures of similarity between word pairs, which were averaged to index how
interchangeable two words are (31), providing a statistical estimate of the
similarity of the semantic concepts referring to the feelings as they are used in
language. To test for the representational similarity of feelings across different
domains and dimensions, we used RSA (17) between the off-diagonal elements
of the similarity matrixes derived from Experiments 1–3, LSA + WordNet, and
NeuroSynth. This resulted in total nine similarity structures: Basic dimensions
(Experiment 1: intensity of bodily feelings and mental involvement, affect, and
controllability), frequency (Experiment 1), subjective feeling space (Experiment
2), bodily sensation maps (Experiment 3), and the data-driven neural
(NeuroSynth) and semantic (LSA + WordNet) similarity structures.
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